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The persistence of the.international debt crisis has given rise
to considerations that foreign direct investment (FDD should
play a larger role in the financing of less developed countries
(LDCs) in the future. FDIs may provide external financing for
developing countries even in times when new lending is restricted
due to high credit risks. Flexible payment schedules and the
extended property rights may differentiate FDIs from interna-
tional loans and provide shelter against high country risks. How-
ever, FDIs are subject to sovereign risk as well. The option of
sovereign states to defer loan repayments as soon as the.costs of
contract fulfillment exceed the benefits has its counterpart in
expropriations of FDI. The potential of substituting FDI for debt
depends on the attitude of the LDCs
1 governments towards FDI. A
larger role for FDI, especially in times of restricted new lend-
ing, will only be possible if the political and economic situa-
tion of the borrowing country that induces creditors to expect a
higher risk of willful default does not increase the risk of
expropriations at the same time.
In the following analysis for thirty-one LDCs we proceed on the
assumption that governments decide on expropriations on the basis
of some rational cost-benefit calculus (Eaton and Gersovitz 1983:
77) . This rules out mass expropriations due to ideological
reasons that affect all'FDIs in a country. The relations between
foreign investors and host governments may then be interpreted in
2
terms of the principal-agent theory . After the investment is
The countries included are listed in Table Al in the appendix.
2
For a recent introduction and survey and an application of
principal-agent theory on LDC debt see Strong and Waterson
(1987) and Sachs (1983).made, the investor (principal) has no means to prevent the host
country's government (agent) to change the contractual base on
which the decision to invest was taken. The government is thus
able to affect ex post the profitability of the foreign invest-
ment. Due to the country's sovereignty, costs for the expro-
priating country can only result from future sanctions imposed by
the foreign investors. With regard to the benefits of expropria-
tions we can distinguish two cases: First, it may be assumed that
the government aims at maximizing the country's welfare. Second,
more realistically, governments may be considered to be mainly
interested in maximizing their own welfare, e.g. in terms of
reelection chances, or else, in terms of popular support on which
even 'modern' dictatorial regimes depend (Tullock 1986, Rubin
1987) . According to political-economy arguments, the government
benefits from expropriations if it thereby obtains support from
groups lobbying in favour of expropriations or is able to collect
financial gains from the expropriations directly and favor cer-
2
tain groups by on-budget expenditures .
Rubin (1987:15) suspects that "modern dictatorship need a base
of at least 20 or 30 percent active support and participation
in its party, mass, and security organizations." Tullock (1987:
126) says about the typical dictator "that not only does he
worry about his own safety, as a rough rule of thumb, he's apt
to also want to be liked. ... Thus the dictator would, other
things being equal, prefer to be the favorite of public opin-
ion. It is true that he frequently will have difficulty in
determining whether he is or isn't, but he may try to improve
his status with the public by doing things that ... they will
approve as well as by increasing the level of torture in his
dungeons." A government is dictatorial in the sense of Tullock
if there are no general and free elections.
2
See Schneider/Frey (1985), who also distinguish between econo-
mic and political variables.This distinction may be of particular importance with regard to
the potential of substituting FDI for foreign debt. Different
level of sovereign risk for FDI and foreign debt will be most
likely if the LDC governments base their decisions on willful
defaults and expropriations on a calculus that maximizes the
country's welfare. In this case the technological diversity of
FDIs renders firm specific factors important for the expropria-
tion decision. The same applies to particular organizational
skills, management techniques, or marketing skills, to name only
a few other characteristics that are frequently subsumed under
technological attributes of a firm broadly defined . The economic
calculus is likely to result in a selective pattern of expropria-
tion. In comparison, loans are characterized by their homogene-
ity, and by syndication with reference to cross-default clauses,
while there is no equivalent in the case of FDIs (e.g. Picht
1988a). The decision on willful default is therefore mainly
influenced by macroeconomic factors. Under such circumstances,
the potential of substitution between debt and FDI can be sup-
posed to be relatively high because the risk determinants differ.
A different situation would evolve if expropriations are a re-
action to general economic difficulties that cause dissatisfac-
tion among the people. Policy-makers that act to stay in power
and maximize their own utility can reasonably be expected to pay
See Caves (1982) and Cassen (1987) for an excellent discussion
and overview, respectively, on the specific advantages that
multinational investors may have.more attention to the common nature of foreign debt and FDI as
foreign claims on domestic output. The political risks for FDI
and foreign debt may then go some way together. The pattern of
expropriation is then likely to be relatively unspecific with
regard to the 'technology' of the affected firms. Unspecific
expropriations may, for example, hit foreign investments with
high public visibility, or else, multinational firms of parti-
cular national origin as it seems to fit the prevailing political
climate. Other varying and changing patterns are conceivable. In
this situation the substitution of FDI for foreign debt becomes
more difficult because the overall economic situation that deter-
mines the general credit risk may also translate into a general
risk of foreign asset expropriation.
This paper tries to identify which of the two different, though
not necessarily exclusive calculi governs the behavior of the
LDCs towards FDI . Economic and political-economic factors that
are considered to determine the countries' costs and benefits
from expropriations are used to explain selective and unspecific
expropriation patterns. In Section II selective expropriation of
FDIs is discussed. Notwithstanding the initial 'naive' assumption
that the government maximizes the country's welfare, this start-
ing point has merits for two reasons. First, it seems to be
easier to formalize a decision calculus that is based on narrowly
Note that in some ideal world a political government may do
what is best in terms of national welfare.defined economic variables that are relevant for the country's
welfare. Second, the differences between FDIs and foreign loans
with respect to their risk exposure are quite straigth forward in
this case. Further analyses of the structure of external LDC
finance (debt/FDI-ratios) ^may have merits if it can be shown that
expropriation risks and willful default risks are determined in
distinctly different ways.
Section III takes up the alternative hypotheses that relate ex-
propriations to a political-economic calculus of the government.
Explanations of the test formats for both selective and un-
specific expropriations are given in Section IV. The empirical
evidence on the importance of the two patterns of government
behavior is reported in Section V. In Section VI the mayor
findings are summarized and interpreted, and conclusions are
drawn with respect to recent in the international debt issue.
II. Hypotheses on Selective Expropriation
The decision calculus of a government aiming at maximizing the
country's welfare can be depicted as an integral of the dis-
counted future costs minus the discounted future benefits from
expropriations . Ideally, the government draws up a specific
cost-benefit calculus for every FDI under consideration for ex-
1 See Basche (1979), Eaton/Gersovitz (1983,1984), Frey (1984),
Lachler (1985), Jodice (1980).propriation. In case of technologically (broadly defined) homo-
geneous FDIs it may be possible that one calculation is valid for
all FDIs of a certain type. Most realistically, this may apply to
investments (firms) in a particular industry. The importance of
the specific costs and benefits is discussed in the next para-
graphs .
Future foreign direct investments and divestments of already
existing FDIs: It is often argued that international investors
will be reluctant to engage in new FDI in a country that has
expropriated foreign firms in the past (Basche 1979:16-17)'. In
addition, foreign direct investors that have not been expro-
priated as yet may reduce the value of their outstanding invest-
ments because they fear further expropriations in the future.
This reduction imposes costs on the expropriating country in
terms of reduced growth perspectives due to foregone FDI.
Additionally, it can be argued that the country loses foreign
production and investment knowledge and the opportunity of know-
how transfers to domestic firms. However, costs in terms of
foregone know-how can be expected to be of only minor importance.
A rational government will only expropriate firms if it is able
to run them reasonably well on its own . Consequently, the coun-
try is unlikely to suffer from considerable know-how losses even
if foreign investors with technologies equivalent to the expro-
priated firm refrain from future investments. Considerable losses
will only arise if foreign investors applying more advanced tech-
See Jodice (1980) on the importance of the country's techno-
logical capabilities for expropriation decisions.nologies reduce their investments. But as long as these investors
do not expect the government to be able to handle their technolo-
gy in the near future, they should stick to their former invest-
ment plans. An economically rational government will not initiate
any measures against them.
Trade relations: Foreign investors that have been expropriated
can be expected to press their governments for collective actions
against the expropriating country. Trade barriers against the
country's exports or even trade embargoes are the most likely
economic sanctions (Eaton/Gersovitz 1983:97). However, past exr
perience has shown that the effectiveness and thus the threat of
those measures is limited at best. Hence, the influence on the
decision of expropriations is supposed to be limited.
International credit lines: Expropriations may induce interna-
tional banks to cut back the country's credit lines. This is
because expropriations indicate high sovereign risk. Especially
trade credits may be affected because foreign-owned firms typi-
cally maintain closer international financial and trade relations
than domestic firms. On the other hand, expropriations reduce
future FDI and thus increase the country's need for additional
lending. This makes sovereign measures against lenders more cost-
ly for the country. Arguably, willful default decisions are gov-
erned by a different set of incentives than expropriations. Con-
sequently we do not expect expropriations to affect the country's
general credit standing. Firm-specific financial relations that
may break down in case of expropriation can be replaced by
extended international :borrowing if the country has access tointernational bank loans. This suggests that credit rationed
countries will incur higher costs in case of expropriations and
should be less willing to expropriate.
Future profits of the expropriated foreign firm: The most ob-
vious economic benefit from expropriation results from the fact
that after the expropriation the firm's profits accrue to the
country's government (Basche 1979: 9-10, Lachler 1985: 31-32). In
this respect only the expected transfers of dividends (and con-
ceivable 'hidden' transfers through transfer pricing) to the
foreign investor constitute an additional benefit. Reinvested
profits benefit the country even with a foreign ownership of the
firm. Assuming that management efficiency is independent of the
firm's ownership, countries should be more likely to expropriate
FDIs that are expected to yield high dividend payments in the
future.
In summary, the costs of selective expropriation are mainly in-
fluenced by the technological standard of the firm, relative to
the country's own technological capabilities, and the expected
volume of future FDIs in this particular industry. These two
factors may be even correlated because in general FDIs take place
in sectors where foreign investors have a technological advan-
tage. Higher expected profits constitute the major incentive in
favour of expropriation. Depending on the particular social costs
and benefits, all FDIs can be ranked with regard to their expro-
priation risks. As far as costs are concerned, firms applying
similar technologies may be grouped together because they gener-
ate similar expropriation costs. Rational governments will thusexpropriate not a single but all of those homogeneous firms if
the benefits exceed the costs. This suggests that the "nationa-
lization" of a sector must not always be a purely political de-
cision but may well rest on an economic calculus.
The classification of foreign owned firms is more difficult with
respect to the benefits the country could obtain by expropriating
them. It cannot be ruled out that single firms experience strong
increases in their profitability which, in turn, will increase
firm-specific expropriation risks. Generally, however, the pro-
fits of firms operating in the same economy can be expected to
move together. If the country's government acts according to its
cost-benefit calculus, the costs from expropriation exceed the
benefits for all FDIs not yet expropriated at each point in time.
High benefits from expropriation that may exceed the costs are
especially likely in times of increasing profits due to macro-
economic developments.
However, the costs and benefits for the country associated with
expropriations are not only determined by the specific characte-
ristics of the foreign firms but also by the available substi-
tutes for FDIs. Foreign investments in a certain industry and
international loans used to set up domestic firms in this sector
may be substitutes for the country. Thus, a country that expro-
priates FDIs and experiences the loss of future FDIs in this
industry may be able to compensate for that loss by domestic
investments as long as it is not rationed in the international
loan market. For that reason we expect that countries with free
access to international credits are more likely to expropriate10
FDIs in times of high expected profitability than credit rationed
countries. The latter ones face the dilemma that expropriations
in highly profitable industries would imply corresponding high
losses of future growth since the expropriations may cut off new
FDIs in these sectors.
III. Hypotheses on Unspecific Expropriation
The preceding discussion leads to the conjecture that expropria-
tions are selective with respect to the affected industrial sec-
tor. The model advanced is based on the 'naive' assumption that
LDC governments attempt to maximize the county's welfare. In
turn, other studies on expropriations have analysed predominantly
political-economy factors that are related to general economic
developments. The implied calculus is that of a government
seeking its own goods rather than the common good of its con-
stituency. The overall economic situation offers a general in-
dicator for the investment climate and the threat of expropria-
tion. Political-economy factors are thus supposed to be more
appropriate for explaining more unspecific expropriations that do
not show a sectoral concentration.
Political instability and sluggish economic development are often
mentioned in the literature for giving rise to increased expro-
priation risks. A worsening of the people's economic situation is
expected to foster political instability and opposition against
the government (Kobrin 1978). It may also lead to increasing11
criticism of foreign ownership of firms. Policy-makers may choose
foreign investors as a scapegoat and channel the public pressure
resulting from economic problems on them (Davies 1981: 6) . But
blaming the foreign investors may be insufficient to regain
political support. Some confirmative action may be required to
prove that the government is doing something about it. The risk
of expropriation increases.
An alternative hypothesis on the effects of economic performance
on expropriation risk has been proposed by Lachler (1985: 31-32).
It is argued that expropriations are more likely in times of an
unexpectedly high increase in national income. This argument is
similar to the decision calculus in the case of selective expro-
priations. However, the reasoning of Lachler is based on macro-
economic costs from expropriation. Unforeseen income increases
lead to unexpectedly high claims of foreign investors on the
national income. In this situation it is more tempting for the
government to expropriate foreign investors.
Balance-of-payments pressure is another factor frequently suppos-
ed to determine expropriation decisions. The government may take
into account that expropriations stop the profit remittances and
thus provide additional resources, especially foreign exchange,
to strengthen economic growth (Jones 1984: 83). The probability
of expropriations should thus increase with balance-of-payments
pressure (Stoever 1982: 11, Lloyd 1974: 29, Truitt 1979: 45-46).
Alternatively it may be argued that expropriations at times of
large external imbalances set counterintentional signals; i.e.,12
expropriations may cause a further drainage of foreign exchange.
The counterhypothesis thus states that expropriations are less
likely in times of balance of payments pressure (Picht 1988a) .
Finally, income variation may lead to a reduction of expropria-
tion risks because of the possible cut-off from future FDI. New
FDI may help to diversify the economy and reduce the income vari-
ability, especially if the economy is mono-structured (Picht
1988a). Furthermore, FDI provides a means of risk-sharing for
countries because the flexible payment schedule to foreign in-
vestors compared to the fixed repayment of loans reduces the
variability of domestic absorption.
IV. The Test Format and Its Data Base
Two alternative hypotheses have been raised regarding the behav-
ior of governments towards expropriation of FDI. The hypothesis
on selective expropriation is based on the assumption that the
government tries to maximize the country's welfare. The decision
calculus that leads to unspecific expropriations assumes that the
government aims at maximizing its own utility. Most importantly,
the hypotheses imply different relations between the country's
economic performance and the risk of expropriation. Therefore,
Note that a non-sympathetic observer of a country governed by a
dictatorial regime may reason that the rulers want to make sure
that enough foreign exchange is available to import luxury
goods for themselves. The implicit assumption, of course, is
the existence of a foreign exchange gap.Bibliothek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft 13
the empirical analysis gives special emphasis to the impact of
the country's economic performance on the expropriation risk.
We applied logit analysis on the basis of cross-country data.
This technique fits to our problem because the dependent vari-
able only takes the value '1' in case of expropriations or '0'
otherwise (Altman et al. 1980:31-33) . The logit technique calcu-
lates the likelihood (P) of expropriations as a function of the
set of explanatory variables (X):
P(l) = [1 + exp - (a + bX)]"
1
Data on the value of expropriated assets is not available. We
refer to a survey which counts every expropriation as one event
without regard to the respective value. The data set for the
present study was provided by F.N. Burton and H. Inoue. They
cover the number of expropriation cases in 53 LDCs from 1960 to
2
1977 and classify them according to the affected sector . The
data is based on a rather broad definition of forced divestment
OLS-regression analysis, thus, is not appropriate. In parti-
cular, it would allow the predicted expropriation likelihoods
to range from below '0' to above '1' which is not acceptable.
The logit-transformation addresses just this problem. Possible
alternative techniques include probit estimates and multiple
discriminant analysis. Probit results are largely comparable to
those achieved with the logit technique, but carry computa-
tional disadvantages. Multiple discriminant analysis requires
the a priori classification into expropriating and non-expro-
priating countries and does not provide an immediate test on
the coefficients' significance.
2
The sectoral classification contains Agriculture (including
Fishery and Forestry), Banking and Insurance, Manufacturing,
Mining, Service Sector and Unclassified, Petroleum (including
Refinary and Distribution), Public Services (Electric Power,
Railways, Water, Transport, Mass Media, etc.), Foreign Trade
and Commerce.14
and includes formal expropriations, extra-legal transfers of
foreign assets, forced sales of FDIs, and contract renegotiations
that ultimately lead to a loss of foreign ownership (Kobrin 1980:
68-69). The cross-country analysis presented here is based on
expropriation cases during 1974/75. Due to the high variability
of economic variables after the oil crisis, this period seems to
be especially appropriate for working out the effects of possible
determinants for expropriation decisions. The dependent variable
VI (expropriation) takes the value '1' for a country whenever
there have been expropriations in 1974 or 1975, and '0' other-
wise. A two-year period has been chosen to buffer the uncertain
time lags that may result from the different institutional struc-
tures in the countries which influence the decision process on
expropriations after relevant economic variables have changed.
The unavailability of data on explaining variables reduced the
number of sample countries to thirty-one. Countries that have
conducted encompassing nationalizations in the context of mayor
changes in the political orientation (Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Ugan-
da) have been excluded. Probably, such expropriations were driven
by ideological reasons with no underlying maximization calculus.
Countries were also excluded when encompassing nationalizations
occurred prior to 1974 and no new FDI took place afterwards.
We classified the expropriating countries into two groups: one
with a selective expropriation pattern, and another one engaged
in more widespread, i.e. unspecific expropriations. The classifi-
cation refers to the number of annual expropriations and the15
number of affected industries. We employed cluster analysis to
separate the expropriating countries. The borderline drawn be-
tween selective and unspecific expropriations is three and more
expropriation events in two or more industrial sectors . The
first subsample is represented by the variable V2, which is set
'1' for cases with selective expropriations, and '0' otherwise.
In the second subsample, the dependent variable V3 takes on the
value '1' in the case of unspecific expropriations, and '0'
otherwise.
Cluster analysis has also been used to provide another classifi-
cation of the country sample. The costs associated with expro-
priation depend in part on the country's access to the interna-
tional credit market. The share of private creditors in total
public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt was considered as
an indicator of credit constraints. A high share of private cred-
itors was assumed to indicate relatively easy access to credit
markets. The dummy variable V4 is based on this cluster, assign-
ing '1' to all countries that were not credit-rationed, and '0'
otherwise. In the empirical tests V4 was combined (multiplied)
with other variables as well. Thereby the incremental output/cap-
ital ratio (IOCR) indicates the average productivity of new
investments in the country . The costs of additional credit nec-
For a detailed exposition of the clustering procedure and the
employed criteria see appendix, part 3.
2
See variable list in the appendix for the exact definition of
all variables mentioned in the text.16
essary to finance the new domestic investments that substitute
FDI is given by the average terms the country must currently
accept in case of new loan commitments (INT).
A credit-rationed country is not able to compensate foregone FDI
by additional credit-financed domestic investments. This is taken
into account by defining the dummy V4T, which is equivalent to
1-V4 and takes the value '1' if a country is credit-rationed. The
dummy was combined with the flows of FDI to the country from 1972
to 1975 (FDIGDP - ratio of foreign direct investments to GDP) to
indicate the costs from the potential loss of future FDI in the
case of expropriation (V4TFDIGDP).
Possible trade sanctions are captured by the variable EX (ratio
of real exports to GDP). The share of the country's exports in
GDP is supposed to indicate the degree of vulnerability to trade
sanctions. Due to the special characteristics of the logit trans-
formation we substituted the constant term by the variable RFDIPC
(reciprocal of FDI per capita). RFDIPC reflects the relative
importance of FDI in the country. A cross-country logit estima-
tion with a non-zero constant term implies that a certain base
probability exists for every country, even if there is no FDI.
The variable RFDIPC allows for a modified base probability that
depends on FDI per capita in the country. Higher FDI per capita
is expected to result in a higher base probability of expropria-
tion.17
Table 2 summarizes the explaining variables that have been em-
ployed in testing the hypotheses on selective expropriations and
the expected signs of the coefficients.
Table 2 - Expected Relationship between the Likelihood of
Selective Expropriations and Major Determinants
Explaining




Notice that higher FDI per capita in a country leads to a
lower RFDIPC because the reciprocal value must be used to
generate zero-likelihood of expropriation in a case of no
FDI. The reason for this transformation is given by the
limiting characteristics of the logit regression function.
We expect that the behavior of the country group with an un-
specific pattern of expropriation is better explained by a
variable set which includes political-economy variables and other
indicators of the countries' overall economic situation. Diie to
data limitations we were not able to include all political-eco-
nomic variables that have been mentioned in the literature on
expropriations. We concentrate on the relevance of variables
that reflect the country's general economic situation and can be
interpreted in a political economic context (Table 3).
Real GDP growth rates per capita (GRPC) are taken as a general
measure of the countries' economic performance. The arguments on
political pressures in case of a sluggish economic performance
suggest that high growth rates go along with low expropriation18
risks. Unexpected income and profit increases that may cause
expropriations are captured by the variable DGR, which measures
the deviation of actual GDP growth rates from the recent growth
trend. Possible risk reducing effects of high income variations
are tested by the reciprocal of the variation coefficient of real
GDP (RVAR).
Table 3 - Expected Relationship between the Likelihood of Unspe-






RFDIPC GRPC DGR RVAR ESR
a a
a
The sign must be interpreted with regard to the fact that the
explaining variable is taken as reciprocal. The reason for
these transformations is given by the limiting characteristics
of the logit regression function.
The balance-of-payments impact of changes in the terms of trade,
interest rates, and real world demand that may influence the
expropriation risk is indicated by an exogenous shock variable
(ESR). Note that ESR is defined such that the variable is larger
when the country is exposed to rising import prices, declining
export prices, etc. As has been argued in section III, the
impact can be positive or negative.
For a detailed description of 'ESR
1 see the appendix.19
V. Empirical Results
The regressions have been organized in such a way that each vari-
able was first used separately to get partial estimates. This was
done without a constant term (sections A of Tables 4 and 5) and
afterwards with inclusion of a constant term (section C of Table
4 and section D of Table 5). Estimates that combined "RFDIPC" as
substitute for the constant term with each of the other explain-
ing variables are reported in section B.
The empirical results at least for the hypothesis on selective
expropriation (pure welfare calculus) are rather discouraging
(Table 4). In the case of partial estimates with and without a
constant term none of the coefficients is significant at the 10
percent level and only RFDIPC and V4TFDIGDP show the expected
signs with a stable pattern in both estimations (Table 4,
sections A and C). The average likelihood of the estimates hardly
exceeds 50 percent, which is the bottom level of unreasoned
chance. The combined estimates with RFDIPC did not improve the
results in a significant way (section B). We must therefore con-
clude that we are not able to present empirical evidence for
selective expropriations in developing countries . This result
must be seen with regard to the fact that it is based on the
surely naive assumption that governments aim at maximizing the
country's welfare and choose their measures according to a narrow
economic calculus.
A similar conclusion has been drawn by Nunnenkamp, Picht (1988)
with regard to willful defaults that may be driven "by other
than macroeconomic considerations, e.g. by internal political
pressures ...", p. 15.Table 4 - Logit Estimates of the Probability of Selective Expropriation in Thirty-One Less Developed Countries




A. 1-8 -2.4K-1.04) -0.0K-0.62) 0.20(0.16) -0.59(-1.05) -0.03(-1.06) 0.09(0.98) -0.03(-0.43) 0.00(0.02)































1- -1.95(-0.76) 0.01(0.27) 3.26(1.40)* -0.47(-0.64) -0.02(-0.67) 0.06(0.54) -0.03(0.41) -O.OK-0.07) -0.60(-0.74) -0.03(-0.04)
[-0.15(-0.35)] [-0.491-0.69)] [-1.05(-l.64)*] t-0.12(-0.24)] [-0.13(-0.28)] [-0.15(-0.32) ] [-0.141-0.29) ] [-0.19(-0.40) ]
AVR.LH. 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.53
aThe results presented in block A as 1 - 8 refgr to the partial estimates without a constant term as indicated by the various explanatory variables. The AVR.LH-values
are presented below the estimation results. - Since DFDI is defined as a dunmy that takes up definitorial differences with respect to FDIQ3P, their impact can only be
estimated jointly. - The results in block C refer to partial estimates with a constant term. The constant term is given in brackets. The star * denotes significance
level of 20 percent.
Sources: See appendix, part 1: list of variables and data tables. Own calculations.21
The best reason for this poor statistical result we can think of
is that expropriating governments may live in the illusion that
they (or their agents) can run whatever private enterprise as
good as the previous multinational owners. Certainly, they can
hire foreign experts, buy new foreign technology, establish own
distribution networks, etc., but it is hard to imagine that the
governments can do so with the same ease across all industries.
Alternatively, government control may just be used for political
patronage, and nationalized enterprises may be operated at almost
any loss to gain the support of consumers and workers crucial for
the regimes survival (Rubin 1987: 19). In this case, the pure
welfare calculus assumed above would come next to irrelevance.
This is the case of consciuos ignorance on the part of expro-
priating regimes.
In the alternative case (political calculus) of the hypothesis on
unspecific expropriations (Table 5), two of the new variables
(GRPC, ESR) prove significant at the 5 percent level in the
partial estimates without a constant term (section A). GRPC shows
the expected sign. ESR is negative, which confirms the hypothesis
that expropriations are less likely in times of balance-of-pay-
ments pressures. The coefficients of GRPC and ESR do not differ
largely in value when they are combined with RFDIPC, which serves
as a substitute for the constant; but the level of significance
deteriorates to 20 percent (section B). All estimates that in-
clude RFDIPC as an additional variable show a higher average






























































































































































D. 42- -9.361-0.76) -0.27(-1.35)* -0.06(-0.46) -0.16(-0.42) -0.251-0.75) -O.1K-1.62)* 1.30(0.47) 0.72(0.72) -0.00(-0.02) -0.10(-0.64) 0.11(0.33) -O.07(-0.07)
53° [-1.16(-1.79)**] C-1.25(-2.32)***] [-1.72(-3.25)***] [-1.35(-1.62)*] [-1.49(-2.88)***] [0.44(0.36)] [-1.95(-2.34)***] [-2.01 (-2.68)***] [-1.641-2.63)***] [-1.95(-2.72)***] [-1.63(-2.58)***]
AMUfl 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.65 (0.64) 0.65 0.64
a The results presented in block. A as 1 - 8 refer to the partial estimates without a constant term as indicated by the various explanatory variables. The AVR.UI-values are presented
below the estimation results. - Since DFDI is defined as a dummy that takes up definitional differences with respect to FDICUP, their impact can only be estimated jointly. - The
results in block D refer to partial estimates with a constant term. The constant term is given in brackets. - The stars ***, **, * denote significance levels of 5, 10, and 20 percent.
Sources: See appendix, part 1: list of variables and data tables. Gm calculations.
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variables. The hypothesis that expropriations are more likely in
times of unexpectedly high economic growth cannot be validated.
The coefficients are insignificant in all estimates that include
DGR. The hypothesis related to DGR is most strongly based on a
narrow economic calculus compared to the other variables dis-
cussed.
The hypothesis that high income variability reduces the expro-
priation risk is clearly falsified by the negative sign of RVAR.
The variable is significant at the 5 percent level in the partial
estimate without a constant and also shows substantial signifi-
cance in the combination with RFDIPC (section B). This result
indicates that the political pressure arising from a highly
variable income is likely to lead to expropriation decisions that
are oriented towards short-run political benefits and disregard
the long-run economic costs.
For comparison, the previous determinants of selective expro-
priation are considered as additional variables, although the
interpretation is sometimes different. As in the estimates on
selective expropriations, the coefficients of the variable set
V4, IOCR, and V4IOCR have negative signs in the partial estimates
(sections A and B). The t-values are comparable to those of the
new variables discussed above. The partial estimates that include
IOCR result in the highest average likelihood. But the meaning of
IOCR and the related variables is different in the setting of
unspecific expropriations. If emphasis is laid on political-
economic arguments, the incremental output-capital ratio and24
access to the international credits have to be interpreted in the
same line as growth per capita. The government of a country that
is not credit rationed and has a high capital productivity is not
likely to come under political pressure to expropriate foreign
firms because of dissatisfaction with the economic development.
For that reason, negative coefficients were to be expected for
IOCR, V4, and V4IOCR. With reference to the average likelihood we
can even conclude that IOCR is a better indicator for this hypo-
thesis than GRPC. IOCR also performs better than V4IOCR and V4,
which is obvious if we look at the multivariate estimates (sec-
tion C). The consideration of credit rationing as a factor that
influences the costs of expropriation is meaningful only for the
selective expropriation calculus. In case of the calculus for un-
specific expropriations, which is oriented towards the country's
general economic situation, the variable IOCR alone seems to be
more appropriate.
The export share variable (EX) appears with the expected negative
sign and with a high significance in the partial estimate without
constant and in section C when it is combined with GRPC. This
indicates that the costs from potential trade sanctions are rele-
vant for unspecific expropriations along the same line as has
been put forward with regard to selective expropriations.
Throughout the multivariate estimates in section C, the variables
GRPC and IOCR are dominant in terms of t-values. The high corre-
lation of these two variables (see Table A2 in the appendix)
renders it impossible to include both variables simultaneously in
the estimates. RVAR and EX remain significant in part of the25
multivariate estimates. The combination of each of these vari-
ables with GRPC results in a relatively high average likelihood.
Estimations of IOCR with other variables that were significant in
the partial estimates result in low t-values of the additional
variables, whereas IOCR remains significant. The external shock
variable poses some problems in multivariate testing because of
the high correlation with most macroeconomic performance vari-
ables. The remaining combinations with ESR result in low average
likelihoods, except the one with IOCR; but ESR is insignificant
in the latter estimate.
From the whole discussion, it should have become clear that the
statistical problems were severe. Nevertheless, a look at the
estimation results in Table 5 suggests that the interpretations
of the variables that measure the actual economic performance of
a country (GRPC and IOCR) are fairly robust with respect to the
specification of the logit-regression function. A similar con-
clusion can be drawn with respect to the external shock variable
(ESR). The estimation procedure is certainly not very convincing
from an econometric point of view (e.g. Picht 1988c: 444-445),
but there is probably not much more one can do in the light of
the limited statistical data available on the expropriation issue
on a cross-national basis.
VI. Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the empirical tests.
First, we were not able to support the hypothesis that selective26
expropriations are driven by a pure welfare-economic calculus
with costs and benefits directly related to the technological
characteristics of foreign firms. Instead, the hypothesis that
governments decide on expropriations with regard to their poli-
tical self-interest seems to be more appropriate. This is true if
we look at more widespread expropriations that are unspecific in
terms of technological standards (industries). The main factor
that drives politically motivated expropriations is the poor
overall economic performance of a country, which reinforces
earlier findings (e.g. Picht 1988a).
The result is revealing with respect to the underlying model of
the calculus of benefits and costs of expropriations. Additional
regressions were run for selective expropriations that included
political-economy variables. The results were as discouraging and
uncertain as the results for the prue welfare-economic calculus.
The only explanation of why overall national welfare consider-
ations as expressed by selective rather than unspecific expro-
priations are not reflected at all in the empirical results we
can think of is that either government illusion about its po-
tential or ignorance prevailed. This does not seem to be totally
unrealistic (Tullock 1986: 9-11) in a world where authoritarian
governments are dominant with its extrem form being the
dictatorship . In fact, a look at the list of countries covered
by this analysis (Table Al, appendix) does not leave any doubts
in this respect.
"The dictator ... has not to worry about the policy outcomes of
his decisions, but about their effect on other high officials
and on other powers in his government. ... He may in various
ways sacrifice the welfare of the state for his own continuance
in office" (Tullock 1987: 116, own emphasis).27
Second, these findings suggest also that a country may face dif-
ficulties if it tries to attract more FDI to compensate for a
reduction in new loan commitments. The same reasons that lead
creditors to restrict new lending, i.e., poor economic per-
formance (e.g., Nunnenkamp and Picht 1988; Picht 1988a, 1988b)
will also induce foreign investors to hesitate with new invest-
ments. Apparently, firm-specific measures of self-protection
generated by the use of technologies that increase the cost of
expropriation for the host country do not seem to be particularly
successful in 'realistic' political settings .
Third, governments must build up a reputation that they do not
succumb to the political pressures against foreign investors and
lenders in case of sluggish economic performance. Otherwise the
access to foreign sources of finance, in particular to loans and
foreign direct investments, will be restricted just in times of
emerging economic difficulties, i.e. when additional foreign
financing is most urgently needed.
Thus, arrangements that serve as 'institutional collaterals' need
to be found that address specifically the government's incentive
to expropriate and willfully default when the economic perform-
ance is poor. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how such arrange-
ments may look like if the presumption, is that one is dealing,
The concept of self-protection was introduced by Ehrlich and
Becker (1972). An elaboration for the case of expropriations
can be found in Sinn (1987) . Practical examples are given in
Poynter (1986) .28
more often than not, with non-democratic, ultimately unaccount-
able regimes. As we have mentioned at the outset, their decision
calculus is hard to conceptualize for the purpose at hand, al-
though our findings suggest that to do so would be more appro-
priate.
It is interesting to note, fourth, that external shocks, which
may eventually lead to real income losses in the future, ini-
tially seem to reduce the likelihood of an expropriation. It is
perhaps here where expropriation risks differ systematically from
default risks, since some empirical evidence is available that
suggests that the risk of willful default increases with external
strains (Nunnenkamp and Picht 1988; Picht 1988a; 1988b). The
difference might be that the change in the expropriation risk
follows with some lag to the initial shock. In other words, the
variable measuring the external shock might be taken as a leading
indicator with respect to the exposure to expropriation risk.
Finally, from all that has been said it should also become ob-
vious that the present euphoria with respect to debt-for-equity
swaps in LDC financing as a way of handling existing 'old' debts
should be looked at with caution from the sovereign risk per-
spective. It appears to us that this aspect has largely been
ignored until present . The reason, of course, is that the debt
crisis was predominantly viewed as either a liquidity or a sol-
vency problem, and as a matter of government opportunism towards
foreign investors and•creditors.
For a recent account and survey on debt-equity-conversations
see Roberts and Remolona (1987) and Huss (1988).29
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Reciprocal of FDI per capita; population in 1975
(mill.)/Estimate of the stock of direct private
investment of DAC members in developing countries
End 1975 (mill. SDR). [Source: International Mone-
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and
OECD, Preliminary Estimate of the Stock of Direct
Private Investment of D.A.C. Members in Developing
Countries]
Average real GDP growth rate per capita in 1974-75;
GDP measured in 1980-prices (national currency).
[Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics]
Difference in real GDP growth between average rates
of 1974-75 and 1970-73.[Source: International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics]
Reciprocal of the variation coefficient of GDP
growth rates 1970-1975, in prices of 1980. [Source:
International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics]
Balance-of-payments impact of external shocks in
1974-75 (average). The varialbe is defined such that
it is the more positive, the stronger the negative
external shocks were (such as declining export
prices, rising import prices, and rising interest
rates); for details see part 2 of the appendix.
Incremental output capital ratio, defined as change
in GDP divided by investment, i.e. gross fixed capi-
tal formation + increase in stocks, in current
prices. Deviating from the standard definition, the
IOCR-values for Morocco and Honduras were calculated
as the ratio of GNP in US$ relative to the capital
stock estimate (see Picht 1988) in prices of 1980.
[Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics]
Ratio of real exports to GDP in 1974-75; real ex-
ports = export value (mill. US$)/[export unit values
(1980=100) • 10], GDP (bill. US$) = GDP in prices of
1980. [Source: International Monetary Fund, Interna-
















Average nominal interest rate of new commitments by
all creditors minus growth rate of US wholesale
price index (1974-75 average). Due to data shortage
the 1974 value was used in the case of Venezuela.
[Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables]
Ratio of foreign direct investments to GDP, in US$.
Direct investments are defined as equity capital
(item 49, table 2) plus other long-term capital
(item 5, table 2). In cases where the dummy variable
DFDJ is set '1', direct investments are measured as
item 49-52, table 2, or item 24, if not available
otherwise. [Source: International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments Statistics, and International
Financial Statistics]
Dummy variable set '1' or '0' depending on the defi-
nition of foreign direct investments (see variable
definition FDIGDP).
Average real GDP growth rate, 1974-75.
FDI-stock in 1975 (in US$).
Dummy variable set 'I
1 if there was at least 1 ex-
propriation in 1974-75, and '0' otherwise.
Dummy variable set '1' if there was selective expro-
priation in 1974-75, and '0' otherwise (see part 3
of this appendix for details).
Dummy variable set '1' if there was unspecific ex-
propriation in the 1974/75, and '0' otherwise (see
part 3 of this appendix for details).
Dummy set '1' if country is not credit constrained,
and '0
1, if country is credit constrained; see part
3.
Dummy variable defined as 1-V4.
Defined as V4 • INT.
Defined as V4 • IOCR.
Defined as V4T • FDIGDP.
Defined V4T • DFDI.31
Part 2: Definition of the External Shock Variable
In order to separate exogenous world-market effects on the bal-
ance-of-payments situation of our sample countries from in-
fluences arising from domestic policies, the sample countries
were assumed to be "small economies", i.e., the determination of
export and import prices, international interest rates, as well
as real world-market demand could not be influenced by any indi-
vidual debtor country. Thus, ESR encompasses terms-of-trade ef-
fects (ES. .), interest-rate effects (ES. ), and real world-
demand effects (ES .) on the country's balance of payments, all
wd
expressed as a percentage share of the sum of the country's nomi-
2
nal exports (X) and nominal imports (M) .
(Al) ESR = (EStQt + ESwd + ESir)/(X + M)
The three elements of ESR were calculated for the 1974-1975
period; the preceding years served as the reference period. The
terms-of-trade effects were defined as follows:
1975
I (MV • p" - XV • PV)



















import prices (unit values);
export prices (unit values);
reference prices; average of the 1971-1973
value.
For further methodological procedures, see Balassa [1981, pp.
142 ff.]; Nunnenkamp [1986, pp. 51 ff.].
2
ESR was calculated relative to the value of external trade
since the absolute US$-amount of external shocks was likely to
depend strongly on the overall size of the sample countries.
Principally, it seemed more appropriate to relate ESR to the
debtors' GDP, since this measure presents a better indication
of the exposure to external shocks. Nevertheless, we selected
the former measure since multicollinearity problems were
reduced in this way.32
The world-demand effects can be written as:
1975









2 act where : XVW = actual export volume of all world-market
suppliers
tr • •
XVW = trend export volume of all world-market sup-
pliers; calculated on the basis of average
annual growth of world-export volumes in the
1971-1973 period;
WMS71/_ = average world-market shares of the sample
countries in the 1971-1973 period; calculated
on the basis of export values.
Finally, the third element, i.e. interest-rate effects, was
^calculated as follows:
1975




(A7) it = it -
where : i. = average interest rate on foreign debt (new
commitments, all creditors);
D = debt outstanding and disbursed at end of
period.
Export and import values of merchandise trade, as given in IMF,
International Financial Statistics, deflated by unit-value
indices of exports and imports (1980=100), as presented in
UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Sta-
tistics, 1986 Supplement.
2
Merchandise exports of sample countries and all world-market
suppliers, as given in IMF, International Financial Statistics.
All data are from World Bank, World Debt Tables; since suffi-
cient information on private non-guaranteed debt was not
available for the mid-1970s, the calculations were based on
public and publicly guaranteed debt exclusively.33
Part 3: Using Cluster-Analysis for Grouping Raw Data
A. Selective vs. Unspecific Expropriation
The raw data provided by Burton and Inoue was aggregated into two
categories that indicate whether annual expropriations in a coun-
try showed a selective or unspecific pattern. The two types of
expropriation were distinguished by taking into account the num-
ber of expropriations during the year and the number of affected
sectors. This yielded a two-dimensional data field. The sectoral
classification contains Agriculture, Finance, Manufacturing,
Mining, Others, Petroleum, Public Services, Transports, and Un-
specified.
The data was divided into two clusters using the Ward-Method
(seuclid). This was done for all 53 countries included in the
original data set, excluding Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda for
reasons explained in the text. It was necessary to "normalize"
the raw data (mean zero, variance one) in order to get an un-
biased classification. Since the present analysis covers only the
years 1974-1975, two dummy variables were defined for 1974 and
1975, respectively. The dummies for each year were set '1' when
the country's expropriation measures were classified as se-
lective, '2' in case of unspecific expropriations, and '0' if
there were no expropriations in the country during that year.
The clustering procedure resulted in a border line between the
two data subsets according to which the expropriations of a coun-
try were classified as unspecific if there were at least 3 expro-
priation events in at least 2 sectors during the year.
The dummy series for 1974 and 1975 were then aggregated into a
single one. Different institutional structures in the countries
determine the decision process on expropriations and may cause
uncertain time lags after relevant economic variables have
changed. Expropriation was assumed to be unspecific, if the con-
dition for "unspecific" was met at least in one of the two years34
in the country. This seems appropriate, because unspecific expro-
priations in one year may have precursors or hangovers in the
preceding or following year; the latter should not be classified
as selective, even if the number of expropriation events was
small. Consequently, a country was classified as selective expro-
priator if there were only selective expropriations in one or
both years.
In the logit regression analysis we tested: (a) cases of selec-
tive expropriations versus the "rest" of the country sample
(containing countries that showed an unspecific expropriation
pattern or did not expropriate at all during 1974/75) and (b)
cases of unspecific expropriations versus all other cases.
B. Credit-Rationed vs. Non-Credit Rationed
The same technique, i.e., the Ward-Method of clustering data
sets, was used to distinguish between countries that are
credit-rationed and those that face no credit constraints.
The 1974/75 average of the share of private creditors in total
public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt by private and
public creditors was used as the clustering variable. The re-
sulting border line laid at about 31 percent of private cred-
itors in total debt. Countries with higher shares are considered
as non-constrained. Based on this classification the dummy vari-
able V4 is set 'I
1 if the country is considered credit-con-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Deviating from the standard definition, the IOCRrvalues for Morocco and Honduras were calculated as the ratio of GNP in US$ per capital stock
estimate (see Picht, 1988a) in Prices of 1980. - Due to data shortages the 1974 value was used in the case of Venezuela.














































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: See variable list in the appendix for the definition of the variables. The significance levels are presented in parentheses.
Source: See data in Table 1 and list of variables. Own calculations.37
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